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NOTES
Civil Rights-EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co.: Extension
of the Newman "Private Attorney General" Doctrine to Title VH
Litigation
The federal district courts are vested with the discretionary power to
award attorneys' fees to prevailing parties in suits under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19641 by section 706(k) of that title. 2 By prescribing the
conditions under which a section 706(k) award is available to prevailing
Title VII defendants, the federal courts have constructed a system of
economic incentives directly affecting the methods by which the Congressional policies underlying Title VII are implemented. In constructing this
system of incentives, the courts have made a series of value judgments about
which of the policies underlying Title VII should be accorded the greatest
weight. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, emphasizing the need to encourage private enforcement through the courts,
held in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. ChristiansburgGarment Co. ,' that a prevailing defendant in a Title VII suit may recover his
attorneys' fees only upon a showing that the suit was brought in bad faith. 4
On February 1, 1968, Rosa C. Helm, a black employee of the Christiansburg Garment Company (Christiansburg or the Company), was laid off
from her job. In May 1968, she filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC or the Commission) alleging a discriminatory motive for the one-month layoff. The EEOC investigated the
charge, advised Christiansburg that it had found reasonable cause to believe
a violation had occured and attempted to obtain the Company's voluntary
compliance in correcting the violation. Upon Christiansburg's refusal to
enter into a conciliation agreement with the EEOC, the Commission issued
Mrs. Helm a letter informing her of her right to bring a civil suit against the
company to compel compliance with Title VII and recover back pay. Mrs.
Helm did not exercise this right.
The EEOC filed suit in federal district court against Christiansburg on
January 25, 1974.1 The district court subsequently granted the Company
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
3. 550 F.2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2948 (1977).
4. Id. at 952.
5. EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 376 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Va. 1974).
On March 24, 1972, an amendment to Title VII was passed empowering the EEOC to sue
eo nomine to secure compliance with that title. This power was "applicable with respect to
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summary judgment.' Thereafter, Christiansburg filed a petition for award of
attorneys' fees pursuant to section 706(k).7 The trial court denied the
petition on the ground that the suit represented a good faith effort by the
Commission to discharge its statutory duties.'
9
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the denial of the petition.
Writing for a two to one majority, Judge Field rejected "reasonableness" as
the appropriate standard for attorneys' fees awards to prevailing Title VII
defendants in favor of a standard of "good faith."10 Recognizing that
prevailing Title VII plaintiffs are ordinarily awarded attorney's fees, 1 the
court stressed that the public policy considerations supporting12liberal awards
to plaintiffs are absent in the case of prevailing defendants.
The Christiansburg holding is the most recent development in feeshifting doctrine in public interest litigation, an area of the law that has
spawned inconsistent results and rationales in the federal courts. 13 These
inconsistencies are due in large part to confusion over the limits of the
"private attorney general" doctrine espoused by the United States Supreme
Court in Newman v. PiggieParkEnterprises,Inc. 14 In Newman, the Court
charges pending with the Commission on the date of enactment of this Act and all charges filed
thereafter." Act of March 24, 1972, Pub.L. No. 92-261, § 14, 86 Stat. 113 (1973).
6. The trial court held that the new enforcement power was not meant to be "completely
retroactive" to the effective date of the original Act of 1964. 376 F. Supp. at 1074. Rather, it
was meant to be limited to charges on which further action remained to be taken by the EEOC
under its original mandate, the last step of which was issuance of notice of right-to-sue to the
complainant. Because the suit was brought three-and-one-half years after the right-to-sue letter
was issued to Mrs. Helm, the EEOC was without authority to prosecute the action. Id.
7. Section 706(k) provides:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States
shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
8. 550 F.2d at 951. The district court opinion on the attorneys' fees issue is unreported.
The district court noted that construction of § 14, see note 5 supra, was an issue of first
impression, accord, 376 F. Supp. at 1073, and that the Commission prevailed on two of
Christiansburg's three motions for summary judgment. See 550 F.2d at 952.
9. 550 F.2d at 952.
10. If. Christiansburg urged the reasonableness standard on the court.
Ii. Id. at 951.
12. Id. In a heated dissent, Judge Widener argued: (1)There is a split in the circuits on the
standard to be applied to defendants' use of § 706(k); (2) policy decisions such as those made by
the majority are matters for Congress, not the courts; (3) the remedies available under Title VII
are so radical, and colorable claims so easy to come by, that a radically different standard for
defendants is not needed to effectuate the policy of antidiscrimination; (4) it is unfair to
defendants to impose such a strict standard, particularly in view of the political malleability of
government agencies; and (5) defendants should recover attorneys' fees when the plaintiffs'
claims, though colorable, are without merit. Id. at 952-54 (Widener, J., dissenting).
13.. See generally Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 301 (1973); Tunney, Foreward:Financingthe Cost of EnforcingLegal Rights, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 632 (1974); Comment, CourtAwarded Attorney's Fees and EqualAccess to the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 636 (1974).
14. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
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held that a prevailing plaintiff under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 196415
should be awarded attorneys' fees under that provision's fee-shifting section1 6 as a matter of course, unless special circumstances would render such
an award unjust. 17 The Court noted that when a private plaintiff sues under

Title II he may obtain injunctive relief only. 18 Such an injunction benefits
the public by advancing the strong Congressional policy of eliminating
discrimination. 19 Further, if aggrieved parties were forced to bear the cost of
bringing suit under Title II, very few would be financially able to invoke the
injunctive power. 20 Because Title II depends upon private plaintiffs for
enforcement, 21 Congress must have enacted the Title II fee-shifting provision not just to penalize irresponsible litigants, but to encourage individuals
injured by discrimination to seek injunctive relief.2 2
The federal courts of appeals, apparently reading Newman as an
23
expansion on the traditional, equitable power to award attorneys' fees,
applied the "private attorney general" rationale to a number of other federal
statutes 24-among them statutes that did not contain any fee-shifting provision.2 5 This practice was abruptly halted by the Supreme Court in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.26 In Alyeska, the Supreme
Court reversed an attorneys' fees award granted to a prevailing plaintiff
suing under the Mineral Leasing Act of 192027 and the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969.28 The Court held that, absent statutory
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970).
16. Id. § 2000a-3(b).
17. 390 U.S. at 402.
18. Id.

19. Id.
20. Id.

21. Id. at 401.
22. Id. at 402.
23. The "American rule" generally prohibits attorneys' fees awards. Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-51 (1975). Under equitable principles, two
exceptions have been fashioned to the rule. First, when the prevailing party has created or
preserved a fund for the benefit of an ascertainable class, attorneys' fees may be awarded if
that fund or the class of beneficiaries will absorb the cost of the award. Second, an award may
be made to a party who was subjected to a bad faith attack by the other party in the course of
the suit, or when the other party wilfully disobeyed a court order. Id. at 257-59.
24. The "private attorney general" rationale has also been applied in nonstatutory cases.
See, e.g., Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 953 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972)
("Newman is directly applicable" in suit to force school board to provide bus transportation to
students forced to change schools by desegregation plan); Comment, Attorney's Fees: Only
Congress Can Award Compensation to Private Attorneys General, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1071,
1076 n.22 (listing cases).
25. See, e.g., Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1972) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970));
Jinks v. May, 464 F.2d 1223, 1228 (5th Cir. 1972) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)); Lee v. Southern
Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 295-96 (5th Cir. 1970) (42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)).
26. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
27. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
28. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4361 (West. 1977).
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authority to award attorneys' fees, the traditional, equitable grounds of bad
faith or common fund are the only grounds that a court may use for fee29
shifting.
Criticism of the stifling effect of Alyeska on privately brought public
interest suits 30 was noted in the lower federal courts. The lower courts,
prohibited by Alyeska from applying the Newman "private attorney general" theory to cases not involving fee-shifting statutes, used the doctrine to
formulate standards for invoking section 706(k) of Title VII. Specifically, a
number of courts extended the "private attorney general" theory as grounds
for allowing prevailing Title VII plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees as a
matter of course 3 ' and restricting awards to prevailing Title VII defendants
to those who have been sued either in bad faith, or upon unreasonable,
32
meritless grounds.
Those courts that have reached the issue are in disagreement as to
whether the standard for defendants' recovery of attorneys' fees should be
the same as that for plaintiffs in Title VII suits. 33 In United States Steel
Corporation v. United States,34 the Third Circuit explained the policies
underlying the distinction:
A prevailing defendant seeking an attorney's fee does not
appear before the court cloaked in a mantle of public interest. In
contrast to the advantage to the public that inheres in a successful
attack against discriminatory practices, as in Piggy [sic]Park, one
cannot say as a general rule that substantial public policies are
furthered by a successful defense against a charge of discriminaSection
tion. Instead, a defendant seeking a counsel fee under
35
706(k) must rely on different equitable considerations.
29. 421 U.S. at 271. The Court stated that "the circumstances under which attorneys' fees
are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters

for Congress to determine." Id. at 262.
30. E.g., The Suprente Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 170-82 (1975); Note,
Attorneys' Fees-Awards of Attorneys' Fees Are Not Permissible Under a Non-Statutory
PrivateAttorney GeneralDoctrine, 7 TEx. TECH L. REV. 122 (1975).
31. E.g., Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Johnson v.

Georgia Hy. Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs,
Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971), 1007 (1972); Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971);

Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
32. E.g., Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976); United States Steel Corp.
v. United States; 519 F.2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1975); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131

(9th Cir. 1974).
33. See cases cited notes 31-32 supra. Recently, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held
that defendants should be subject to the same standaid as plaintiffs in pursuit of § 706(k)
awards. EEOC v. Bailey Co., 46 U.S.L.W. 2177 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 1977); United States v.
Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., 46 U.S.L.W. 2153 (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 1977).

34. 519 F.2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1975).
35. Id. at 364, quoted in EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 550 F.2d at 951.
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While distinguishing on policy grounds awards to plaintiffs and awards to
defendants, the United States Steel court failed to formulate precisely the
standard to be applied to defendants. Rather, the court used a string of
adjectives that included "bad37 faith, vexatious, or harassing" 36 as well as
"unfounded [or] meritless."
The United States Steel decision commenced a new swing in the
Newman doctrine pendulum. The Fourth Circuit decision in Christiansburg, calling for the application of the strict standard, one that requires
actual bad faith, to Title VII defendants seeking the benefit of section
706(k), marks the apex of that swing.
The Christiansburgcase raised two important issues: (1) whether the
standard to be applied to prevailing Title VII defendants should be different
from that applied to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs under section 706(k); and
(2) if so, whether the standard for defendants should be the strict "good
38
faith" standard, or the more expansive "reasonableness" standard.
On its face, section 706(k) requires only that the court use its discretion
in awarding attorneys' fees and prescribes no standards by which that
discretion is to be exercised. It would appear, however, that the statute
intends to extend the equitable power of the courts to grant attorneys' fees
39
when bad faith is present.
Though there is a paucity of legislative history pertaining specifically
to section 706(k), comments from the floor of Congress concerning the
strikingly similar fee-shifting provision of Title II 4 indicate that the latter
section was enacted to make it easier for poor plaintiffs to bring meritorious
suits 41 while at the same time discouraging frivolous ones. 42 Congress
The court also stated that "[a] routine allowance of attorney fees to successful defendants
• . . might effectively discourage suits in all but the clearest cases, and inhibit earnest advocacy
on undecided issues." 519 F.2d at 364-65.
36. 519 F.2d at 364.

37. Id. at 363 (quoting the trial court finding, 385 F. Supp. 346, 349 (W.D. Pa. 1974), with
approval).
38. See text accompanying note 10 supra. It should be patently unreasonable to abuse the

judicial system in an attempt to harass, embarrass or otherwise act in bad faith. The "bad faith"
category is contained, therefore, in the "unreasonableness"

category.

39. One writer has noted that "since the traditional policy is so ingrained and widely
known, the statute can only be regarded as a deliberate departure [therefrom]." Walker, Title

VII: Complaintand Enforcement ProceduresandReliefandRemedies, 7 B.C. INDUS. AND COM.
L. REV. 495, 506 (1966).
40. The section provides: "In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the

court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the
same as a private person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).

41. Senator Humphrey, arguing in favor of the section as floor manager of the Act, said,
"This should make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit." 110
CONG. REC. 12724 (1964).
42. Senator Pastore remarked that the provision's purpose was to force a prospective Title
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apparently assumed that the application of the provision to plaintiffs and
defendants would not be uniform. Plaintiffs were to be encouraged to bring
suit under Title HI by a liberal fee-shifting policy; awards to defendants were
intended only to deter the institution of groundless suits. The difference in
the policy goals of the two awards implies a difference in the standards
regulating their invocation.
Any analogy between Title II and Title VII, however, must be drawn
with care. Fundamental differences in the remedy provisions and enforce43
ment mechanisms of the two titles caution against its unqualified adoption.
As the Supreme Court noted in Newman, compensatory damages are not
available under Title II.1 The Title II plaintiff could thus be appropriately
characterized as a "private attorney general" 45 because the injunctive relief
he sought would not benefit him except as an incident to his membership in
the aggrieved minority group. A Title VII plaintiff, however, may sue not
only for injunctive relief but also for monetary relief in the form of up to two
years' back pay. 46 A privately initiated Title VII suit is not, therefore, as
clearly called "private in form only." '4 7 From the Title VII plaintiff's
viewpoint, the prospect of "make-whole relief" can act as an incentive
offsetting the danger that, should he lose, an award of attorneys' fees would
be made to the defendant. The Title LI plaintiff, denied this prospect of
monetary relief, would be more heavily burdened financially by a liberal
48
policy of awarding attorneys' fees to Title II defendants.
Moreover, Title II relies primarily upon privately brought suits for
enforcement. 49 Title VII, by contrast, was originally concerned primarily
II plaintiff to "make certain that he is not on frivolous ground." Id. at 14214; see United States
Steel Corp. v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 346 (W. D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir.
1975).
43. See Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 90-91 (4th Cir. 1971) (Boreman, J.,
dissenting).
44. 390 U.S. at 402.
45. Id. The Court characterized privately brought Title II suits as "private in form only."
Id. at 401.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). Additionally, the court is empowered to
fashion "any other equitable relief [it] deems appropriate." Id. The Supreme Court has stated
that the court should attempt to recreate those conditions that would have obtained had there
been no discrimination. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
47. 390 U.S. at 401.
48. In Fort v. White, 530 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1976), the court refused to apply the Newman
doctrine as grounds for allowing fee awards to Title VIII (fair housing) plaintiffs as a matter of
course. The court stated that "[42 U.S.C.] § 3612(c) [(Supp. V 1975)]. . .expressly provides
for actual as well as punitive damages. . . so that the successful litigant in the usual case will
be able to pay his counsel fees out of damages." Id. at 1118. The court in Carrion v. Yeshiva
Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976), distinguished Fort v. White on the erroneous assumption
that Title VII provides only for injunctive relief. Id. at 727 n.7.
49. The Attorney General may sue in cases where a "pattern or practice" of discrimina-
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with securing voluntary compliance in ending discrimination through the
efforts of the EEOC,5 0 which was granted broad powers to investigate

charges filed with it.51 In addition, in 1972, the EEOC was further em-

powered to bring suit eo nomine to enforce Title VII. 52 It cannot be said,
therefore, that the need for private enforcement of Title 3VII approaches in
magnitude the need for private enforcement of Title H.1
These distinctions do not, however, go to the essential justification for
differentiating between plaintiffs' and defendants' invocation of section
706(k). When a private plaintiff brings suit under Title VII, he confers a
substantial and judicially cognizable benefit on the public in furthering the
54
strong Congressional policy of ending employment discrimination. Further, allowing prevailing Title VII defendants to recover attorneys' fees as a
matter of course would severely impair the right conferred upon aggrieved
employees by Congress in 196455 and expressly preserved in 197256 to bring
suit to vindicate their civil rights. Prospective Title VII plaintiffs would be
deterred from fully litigating complex or novel issues by the prospect of
being forced to absorb the full cost of their resolution. 57 Attorneys would be
discouraged from representing Title VII plaintiffs by the increased likelihood that their clients, after paying a prevailing defendant's attorneys' fees,
58
would be unable to pay their own counsel fees.
tion is alleged, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5(a) (1970), and may intervene in suits of "general public
importance." Id. § 2000a-3(a).
50. Representative Lindsay, a member of the House Judiciary Committee when the Act
was being considered there, explained that under Title VII "unless this voluntary procedure is
complied with nothing further can happen." 110 CONG. REc. 2565 (1964); cf. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973) (EEOC right-to-sue letter prerequisite to
complainants' cause of action). The bill would originally have allowed the civil action in
advance of conciliation efforts, but that provision was stricken to make certain that conciliatory
efforts were attempted first. See 110 CONG. REC. 2566, 2576 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm.). But see Walker, supra note 39: "The system of

individual enforcement was the result of a conscious, explicit rejection of a system of administrative enforcement, and liberal awards of attorney's fees to successful complainants are
necessary if the system is to work as intended." Id. at 506 (footnotes omitted).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (Supp. V 1975).
52. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see note 5 supra.
53. Furthermore, the EEOC provides the complainant with many services, such as investigation and negotiation of settlement, which would have to be performed by a Title II plaintiff's
attorney. Lea v. Cone Mills Corp. 438 F.2d 86, 90 (4th Cir. 1971) (Boreman, J., dissenting).
54. See cases listed at notes 31-32 supra.
55. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(f)(1), 78 Stat. 260-61 (1964).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(i) (Supp. V 1975).
57. See Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 305-06; cf. 110 CONG. REc. 6541 (1964) (remarks of
Senator Humphrey concerning the prohibitive costs of litigating a civil rights suit).
58. See Nussbaum, supra note 13, at 309. The deterring effect on attorneys would not be
lessened by the present liberal policy of appointing counsel for plaintiffs and authorizing the
commencement of the action without pre-payment of fees, costs or security pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). Cf. Harris v. Walgreen's Distribution Center, 456 F.2d
588 (6th Cir. 1972) (would be abuse of discretion to refuse plaintiff's request of appointment of
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To be party-blind in awarding attorneys' fees under section 706(k)
would be to ignore the financial advantage ordinarily enjoyed by a Title VII
defendant because of its ability to spread the costs of litigation through an
increase in union dues 59 or the cost of its product. Adequate representation
and litigation of important issues would be hampered by economic disparity; 6° the traditional goals of fee-shifting 6 1-fair allocation of litigation costs
and the strengthening of legal rights through increased access to judicial
remedies-would be obscured.
Finally, Congress enacted the EEOC enforcement powers provision of
the 1972 Act in an effort to curb abuse of the persuasion-conferenceconciliation approach of Title VII by employers who, realizing that the
litigation burdens shouldered by Title VII plaintiffs made private enforcement unlikely, found resistance economically preferable to negotiated compliance. 62 Liberal application of section 706(k) to defendants would threaten
the return of such abuse as private plaintiffs would be even more strongly
deterred by the financial risks and burdens of Title VII litigation. The same
level of deterrence presumably would not apply to the EEOC because of its
deeper pocket. However, the effectiveness of a threatened EEOC suit as an
encouragement to conciliation would be weakened if the employer could
expect to recover his attorneys' fees in any suit he won.
Recognizing the need for preserving adequate incentives for private
enforcement of Title VII, the Christiansburg court approved the basic
distinction drawn in United States Steel between plaintiff and defendant
attorneys' fees awards. 6 3 The court went further, however, eliminating the
good faith-reasonableness ambiguity present in the United States Steel
standard. Judge Field's opinion extended the "private attorney general"
rationale to justify adoption of the strict "good faith" standard and, in so
holding, gave Newman the broadest reading it has received since Alyeska.
The Christiansburgcourt rested its decision solely on policy grounds.
It did not purport to derive its holding from the legislative history of the Title
counsel solely because the EEOC had found no reasonable cause to believe a violation had
occurred). Plaintiff would still owe the appointed attorney after the suit was over. Legal aid

services, already over-burdened, would not be in a position to absorb an increased caseload due
to unwillingness of the private bar to risk Title VII litigation. See Clark, Legal Services

Programs-TheCaseloadProblem, or How to Avoid Becoming the New Welfare Department,
47 J. URB. L. 797 (1970). "[TJhe most serious national legal problem of the poor is the over-

extended caseload in legal services programs." Id. at 798.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Title VII applies to labor unions by virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e) (Supp. V 1975),
See Tunney, supra note 13.
See Comment, supra note 13.
See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1971).
550 F.2d at 951.
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II fee-shifting provision. 64 Nor did it undertake any textual analysis to
support the rejection of the objective "reasonableness" standard.6 5
Courts have traditionally had the equitable power to award attorneys'
fees to a prevailing defendant who was sued in bad faith. The limit imposed
by Christiansburgon defendants' use of section 706(k) does not, therefore,
increase their opportunity to recover attorneys' fees against private plaintiffs
beyond that available at common law. 66 In effect, the court construed the
word "party" in section 706(k) to mean "plaintiff" and thereby read
prevailing defendants out of the statute.
The propriety of this interpretation of section 706(k) cannot be determined without considering the entirety of Title VII. In exercising the
discretionary, remedial power under section 706(k), the courts should seek
to further the substantive policies of the Act. The Christiansburgmajority,
while resting adoption of the strict standard on the need to further the
policies of Title VII and an asserted lack of support for defendant awards
discernible therefrom, failed to consider the legislative goals in detail.
The primary purpose of Title VII has been described as prophylactic,
one of deterring discrimination. 67 By prescribing in the original and amending acts the methods by which Title VII claims should be handled, Congress
devised a scheme of enforcement calculated to provide the maximum deterring effect on unfair labor practices, while ensuring full, fair and efficient
resolution of individual claims.
The EEOC was vested with no enforcement powers under the original
version of Title VII, 68 although it was empowered to conduct a full investigation of filed claims. 69 If the Commission found reasonable cause to
believe a violation of Title VII had occurred, it resorted to informal methods
64. The comments on the Congressional floor concerning that provision fail to differentiate between the objective and subjective standards, see, e.g., notes 41-42 supra, and

therefore cannot support the rejection of either.
65. There is no consensus among the federal district courts on which standard is appropriate. Compare Robinson v. KMOX-TV, 407 F. Supp. 1272 (E.D. Mo. 1975), with EEOC v.

Western Elec. Co., 10 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1275 (D. Md. 1975), and Lee v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry., 389 F. Supp. 84 (D. Md. 1975). See generally Note, Recovery by PrevailingDefendants in Title VII Actions, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627 (1977). None of these cases rely on

Newman in reaching its result.
66. See note 23 supra. The section does carve out an exception to the prohibition of 28
U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. V 1975) against attorneys' fees awards against the federal government.
Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974). But this can hardly be the sole
effect that Congress intended § 706(k) to have on defendants' fee awards in view of the use of
the word "party" in the section.
67. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
68. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 259 (1965) (no provision for
EEOC pursuit of legal remedies); notes 5 & 6 supra.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975).
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of conference, persuasion and conciliation in an effort to obtain voluntary
compliance. 70 Judicial recourse was available only to the complainant, who
71
was given statutory standing to sue for injunctive and compensatory relief.
This voluntary approach proved inadequate, 72 provoking the Ninetyfirst Congress to authorize the EEOC to bring suit to compel compliance
with the title. 73 The fact that Congress, upon discerning the inadequacies of
the 1964 Act, did not provide further incentives for private enforcement, but
instead enlarged the powers of the Commission, strongly suggests that the
74
EEOC was to continue to play the primary role in administering Title VII.
The Fourth Circuit's adoption of the strict standard in Christiansburg
encourages Title VII litigation by the EEOC as well as by private plaintiffs.
But the incentive to the EEOC must be presumed to be the lesser of the
effects because its ability to satisfy adverse section 706(k) awards can be
enhanced by Congress if the need arises. Conversely, the impetus to private
litigation is substantially greater. Thus, the Christiansburgcourt has effected a shift in the enforcement shares of complainants and the EEOC from that
chosen by Congress.
The Christiansburg court's invocation of the good faith standard is
premised on the need for further incentives to private enforcement of Title
VII. More fundamentally, the decision reflects a policy judgment that an
increase in privately brought Title VII suits, to be achieved by minimizing
the risk of double attorney costs to plaintiffs, will further the Congressional
goal of eliminating discrimination; in other words, it assumes that further
incentive to private plaintiffs is advisable as a method of furthering the
policies of Title VII.
It is likely that more instances of employment discrimination will be
remedied judicially by application of the strict standard, but the practical
effect of the findings and conciliation efforts of the EEOC, achieved through
expensive and time-consuming investigative and conference procedures,
may be diminished. Aggrieved persons are not precluded from bringing
Title VII actions by an EEOC finding of no reasonable cause. 75 The more
incentive a complainant has to sue, the more likely it is that he will disregard
70. Id.
71. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
72. The House Labor Committee observed: "[T]he Commission has been able to achieve
successful conciliation in less than half the cases in which reasonable cause was determined. It
has been the emphasis on voluntariness that has proven to be most detrimental to the successful
operation of Title VII." H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1971).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Supp. V 1975).
74. See note 77 and accompanying text infra.
75. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971), 1007 (1972).
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such a finding. Similarly, a complainant dissatisfied with a conciliation
agreement between the EEOC and the alleged offender may bring suit under
Title VII for judicial resolution of his claim.7 6 With greater incentive, a
complainant is more likely to find such an agreement unsatisfactory. Consequently, an employer or union may find that its efforts to cooperate with the
EEOC investigation and negotiate a settlement are to a substantial degree
wasted.77
In considering the role the EEOC was to assume in enforcing Title VII,
Congress was not concerned solely with finding the most efficient means of
resolving employment disputes. Substantial concern was voiced in committee that the extra-judicial procedures of the EEOC do not adequately protect
the rights of the parties. 78 Some provision for access to the courts was
deemed necessary to provide the due process safeguards of a full adversary
proceeding and to afford the courts a measure of supervision over the
79
EEOC's findings and activities.
Promotion of the policies of Title VII, then, requires an allocation of
enforcement burdens between private plaintiffs and the EEOC that, while
effecting efficient claim disposition, preserves the due process safeguards
and judicial control necessary to assure full and fair claim adjudication. The
Christiansburgopinion offers no guidance as to why further encouragement
to private plaintiffs is needed or advisable to effect a proper allocation of
enforcement burdens. But in applying the strict "good faith" standard to
prevailing defendants because the policies of Title VII were assertedly
furthered thereby, 80 it implicitly made such a judgment.
The Christiansburgcourt could be viewed as having relied solely on
the absence of equitable or policy considerations supporting section 706(k)
awards to defendants. If the court did so, however, it did so without
comment. While stating that a prevailing defendant seeking to use section
706(k) must rely on "different equitable considerations,"'" it neglected to
76. Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. La. 1972).

77. The Senate Labor Committee permitted individuals to seek judicial remedies when the
Commission has not reached a satisfactory resolution of their claims, but it expected that
"recourse to this remedy will be the exception, and not the rule." S. REP. No. 415, supra note
62, at 23. One writer noted that § 706(k) was designed to encourage voluntary compliance with
the EEOC requirements. Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
431, 453-54 (1966).
78. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13,40 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 914, Pt.
2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963).
79. See Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 613, 617 (E.D. La. 1972). See
also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
80. 550 F.2d at 951-52.
81. Id. at 951 (quoting United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d at 364).
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discuss what those considerations might be. 82 In so doing, the court may
have overlooked some valid arguments for awards to defendants.
When an employer or union has defended against a suit unreasonably
brought, that party has often vindicated one of the primary legislative goals
of Title VII, the alleviation of "economic waste that is caused by denial of
job opportunities., 83 By preserving a legitimate employment practice the
defendant has increased the set of court-approved devices that employers
may use to obtain optimum production levels. Fairness and public policy
would appear to dictate that such a defendant be made whole for his
expenses in clearing the way for unhindered public use of the unreasonably
84
challenged prerogative.
Moreover, an employer who is over-deterred from defending legitimate
labor practices may avoid instituting many of those practices at the outset.
An alleged offender called to the EEOC conference table finds itself in an
inferior bargaining position because, should it fail to reach a conciliation
agreement, it faces an expensive lawsuit with virtually no chance of recovering its expenses under section 706(k). Should the suit be brought by the
complainant, the defendant, should he lose, has certain double-expense to
fear. As a result, practices that were never considered by Congress to be
violative of Title VII may be abandoned without contest. A prudent employer, confronted with the substantial financial risks of defending his labor
practices, may conform his labor practices, not to the construction of Title
VII rendered by the courts, but to a reading of the title that avoids these
threshold risks.
The effects of over-deterring a Title VII defendant otherwise disposed
to defend its practice operate not only to limit the set of court-approved
management prerogatives, but also to expand informally the scope of Title
VII prohibitions. Adoption of the strict standard, to the extent that it
precipitates abstention from labor practices not prohibited by Title VII as
intended or construed, impairs the integrity of the Act and is therefore
counter-productive.
Failure to consider this and other policies and equities detracts from the
persuasive force of the Christiansburgreasoning. However, the analogy
drawn from the legislative history of the fee-shifting provision of Title II and
the Congressional policies of providing aggrieved employees access to the
82. Presumably, the court considered defendants' possible equities to be limited to the

traditional punitive purpose of awards when the suit was brought in bad faith. See Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1,5 (1973).
83. 110 CONG. REC. 1639 (1964) (remarks of Mr. Lindsay).

84. "[M]anagement prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the
greatest extent possible." H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 78, at 29.
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courts, deterring discrimination and preventing abuse of Title VII procedures, support the Fourth Circuit conclusion that a stricter standard be
applied to defendants seeking the benefit of section 706(k) than to plaintiffs.
The weaknesses in the Title II analogy do not militate against the imposition
of different standards. Rather, they demonstrate that the magnitude of that
difference should be discerned from the policies underlying Title VII, not
Title ]I.85 More generally, they highlight the need for a limit on the
extension of the "private attorney general" (Newman) doctrine to Title VII
issues.
The Christiansburgdecision, in its failure to recognize such a limit, is
not supportable by precedent or legislative history and distorts the plain
meaning and import of section 706(k). The extension of the Newman
doctrine to justify applying the strict "good faith" standard is dissonant
with the scheme of enforcement of Title VII and the correlative enforcement
responsibilities of EEOC and private complainants. Ignoring the warning
voiced in Alyeska by the Supreme Court, 6 the Christiansburgcourt has
seen fit to substitute its policy judgment for that of Congress.
In view of the primary role played by the EEOC in Title VII enforcement, the need to encourage private attorneys general further is slight at
best. 87 Though the incremental increase in incentive to privately initiated
suits is small, the threat to the efficient functioning of the Congressionally
created enforcement mechanism, to legitimate employment practices and to
the integrity of the Title, as drafted and construed, is increased by an amount
quantifiable only upon future experience.
The equities are not all on the side of the plaintiff, as the Christiansburg majority asserts. Title VII, an exercise of the Congressional
power over interstate commerce, 8 8 quite appropriately is concerned with
85. "[A] search for the meaning of the Title VII [attorneys' fees] provisions in the
language and application of other [attorneys' fees] statutes is to a great extent bound to be
sterile and unprofitable. A better guide is the underlying policy of Title VII." Walker, supra
note 39, at 505.
86. 421 U.S. at 263-64.
87. As previously noted, see note 46 and accompanying text supra, the back pay provision of Title VII provides substantial encouragement to many private attorneys general. In
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Supreme Court noted:
As the Court observed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.. . . the primary objective [of
Title VII] was a prophylactic one: "[i]t was to achieve equality of employment
" Backpay has an obvious connection with this purpose. If emopportunities ....
ployers faced only the prospect of an injunctive order, they would have little incentive
to shun practices of dubious legality. It is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay
award that "provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to selfexamine and to self-evaluate their employment practices. .... "
Id. at 417-18 (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
88. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (Supp. V 1975) (definition of "industry affecting commerce").
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economic efficiency. An employer or union that successfully defends its
labor practices against unreasonable attack confers a substantial benefit on
commerce and vindicates the strong Congressional policy of efficient employment of labor.
Denying prevailing Title VII defendants the benefit of section 706(k),
except when subjected to suits brought in bad faith, is inappropriate. The

"reasonableness" standard, which would exclude all suits brought in bad

faith or upon unreasonable or meritless (though perhaps colorable) grounds,
more properly implements the policies of Title VII, and reflects more
89
accurately the equities of Title VII litigation.
SAUL LouIs MOSKOWITZ

Criminal Law-Controlled Substances-North Carolina
Adopts a Novel View of Physician Punishment
Under Controlled Substances Act
One of the major concerns of state and federal legislation in the past
decade has been the illicit diversion of controlled substances from legitimate
channels of distribution. ' While courts interpreting this legislation generally
89. The reasonableness of a Title VII suit should, of course, be resolved by the trial court
by reference to the policies underlying Title VII and the equities of each case. Some factual
considerations are of particular relevance. The court should determine to what extent the
EEOC procedures were used to obtain settlement of the claim. A prior EEOC finding of no
reasonable cause, though not dispositive of the reasonableness issue, should be accorded heavy
weight, if based upon extensive investigation. Similarly, a conciliation agreement that was
refused by the plaintiff-complainant, if fair and reached by the EEOC and defendant in good
faith, should operate to thrust upon the plaintiff a greater risk of an adverse § 706(k) award. The
court can thereby promote the full and effective involvement of the EEOC in Title VII disputes.
Substantial abuse of the EEOC or court processes, including "bad faith" suits, seems to be
patently unreasonable. Abuse of less egregious sorts can be balanced along with other considerations. Other considerations should be given weight. For example, did defendant prevail
on the merits or on procedural grounds? An award of attorneys' fees for prevailing on
procedural grounds does not further the policy of efficient allocation of labor for no labor
practices have been approved.
In weighing relevant factors, the benefits foreseeably flowing from a successful complaint
should be weighed according to the probability that success would have been realized. In the
instant case, the probability of success by the EEOC was low, because the argument that its
power to sue eo nomine was retroactive to 1965 was untenable in view of the wording of § 14.
See note 5 supra. If interpretation of that section had not been an issue of first impression, but
had been previously construed in a manner hostile to the EEOC position, the probability of
success would have been even lower. The probability of success turns, then, on what strength
the case of both parties could reasonably have been said to have at the outset of the litigation.
1. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1444, Pt. 1, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in
[19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4566, 4566 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].

